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Abstract.
!e work analyzes the Cartesian expression “cogito ergosum” from the points of view of the 
traditional and the modern logics. !e expression is shown to be an enthymeme with the major 
premise omitted. Two ways of the major premise interpretation are made clear: 1) as a conventional 
assertion (a most commonly accepted view among philosophers); 2) as a proposition containing 
an equivalence. It is shown that the equivalence of “thinking and being” assumed by Descartes has 
once opened up the logical-anthropological opportunity to proclaim as “non-existing” what does 
not think. !e last assertion provides the basis of “Ratiofundamentalism”. !e work demonstrates 
that the Cartesian enthymeme analysis concerns directly our understanding of the ontological 
status of man and is inseparable from the questions of biomedical ethics.
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Cogito, ergo sum: del entimema a la bioética
El trabajo analiza la expresión cartesiana “cogito ergo sum” desde el punto de vista las lógicas 
tradicional y moderna. La expresión se muestra como un entimema con la premisa mayor omitida. 
Dos formas de  interpretar la premisa mayor son claras: 1) como una a"rmación convencional (la 
visión más aceptada entre los "lósofos), 2) como una proposición que contiene una equivalencia. Se 
demuestra que la equivalencia de “pensar y ser” asumida por Descartes una vez abierta la oportunidad 
lógico-antropológica para proclamar como “no existente” lo no pensante. La última a"rmación es la 
base del fundamentalismo racionalista. El trabajo demuestra que el análisis del entimema cartesiano 
se re"ere directamente a nuestra comprensión de la condición ontológica del ser humano y es 
inseparable de la cuestión de la ética biomédica.
Palabras clave: epistemología, lógica, Cogito, Descartes, entimema, Raciofundamentalismo.
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Introduction
Investigating rational foundations of the relationship between man and the world has since 
very old times been the cherished subject of philosophers, scholars and even theologians. 
!e number of explanations suggested for such relationship could really be "tted into no 
less than voluminous encyclopaedias or special dictionaries.   
So, in the present paper, we shall reduce the "eld of our investigation to the range of 
such views and convictions that are typical of a quite de"nite trend in the explanation of 
the said relationship. Let us call this trend “ratiofundamentalism”, taking for the semantic 
basis of the term “ratio” its standard translation as “reason, intellect, intelligence”. And 
“fundamentalism” will be understood here as “a strongly (and consciously) "xed attitude 
of mind based upon exaggerating some principles that are supposed to be self-obvious and 
excluding all attempts to doubt their truth (validity)”.  If now we add the standard meaning 
of the Latin “ratio” to this de"nition of “fundamentalism” we’ll get a working de"nition of 
the newly introduced notion. 
!us ratiofundamentalism will be de"ned as “a strongly (and consciously) "xed attitude 
of mind based upon exaggerating principles of reason and intelligence that are supposed to 
be self-obvious and excluding all attempts to doubt their truth (validity)”.  Here a question 
seems quite logical: What singles out ratiofundamentalism in the real body of philosophic 
thought? What’s its di#erence from the ordinary rationalism?  
Indeed, rationalism as a school of thought has at least a two-and-a-half-thousand-year 
history.  But throughout all those years rationalism did not remain the same. !e antique 
rationalism di#ered quite seriously from the mediaeval one, which was also not the same as 
its new-time version.  Among the new-time rationalists, Rene Descartes practically holds 
the exceptional place of its main founder and theorist. Of course, we can’t go without 
mentioning Gottfried Leibniz and Emmanuel Kant and many others along with Descartes, 
but it was this latter who gave us the most vivid and concise formula of its essence: Cogito, 
ergo sum.  !is short statement was to become the motto and banner of the entire Age of 
the Enlightenment. 
It is only natural that such outstandingly expressive stand as Descartes’ could not escape 
criticism from the most di#erent points of view. Some scholars1 trace up to Descartes 
the beginning of the so-called “calculating rationality” de"ning at large the horizons of 
the 18th–19th-century science and scholarship.  Others, like Albert Schweitzer, censure 
Descartes for his “existential pessimism”, that is, for his reducing the fullness of “life ethics” 
to mere thinking2.  Jose Ortega y Gasset criticizes the Cartesian Cogito in his “What is 
 6HHHJ+HLGHJJHU07KH(XURSHDQ1LKLOLVP3UREOHPLQ:HVWHUQ7KLQNLQJ0RVNYD3URJUHVV
1988, p.285.  
2 Schweitzer A. Culture and Ethics. Moskva, Progress, 1973. P.306. 
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Philosophy ?”  for the “substantialism” using, at the same time,  the metaphorical tools and 
bases on “philosophy of life” 3. 
However, M. Heidegger’s, A. Schweitzer’s and Ortega’s criticisms come to nothing 
more than stating the fact of “wrongness” of the famous Descartes’ “cogito, ergo sum”, giving 
it no analytical, i.e. duly and properly rational, study. 
Along with the critical view upon the Cartesian statement from the existentialist 
standpoint, there is a much more subtle analysis of it from the logical-philosophical point 
of view, with the best examples in R.Carnap’s 4  and J.Hintikka’s5 works. It should be 
mentioned at the very beginning that Carnap analyzes the famous statement from the 
radical standpoint of logical positivism, whereas Hintikka’s approach is more balanced and 
relies on his awareness of non-classical logics that had been simply out of Carnap’s scope in 
the year of 1932. As the results we have reached analyzing the Cartesian Cogito, ergo sum 
cannot be found in either existentialist or logical writings, we consider it right to start this 
article with demonstrating our approach.  
!e famous Descartes’ enthymeme
So, let us go back to Descartes’ authentic statement from the fourth part of his 
“Dissertation on the Method”:
…But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was 
false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I 
observed that this truth – I think, therefore I am (COGITO, ERGO SUM) – was so certain 
and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by 
the sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as 
the  "rst principle of the philosophy of which I was in search.6
From all this Descartes’ paragraph we are interested most of all in the statement used 
by Descartes as the fundamental tenet for his new rationalism:  
I think, therefore I am.
From the very fact Descartes used the word  ergo, “therefore”, we can be sure here we see 
a reasoning.  But what kind of reasoning?   
As this  ergo  is preceded by an attributive proposition and followed by another one, we 
cannot doubt the fact: here we have a reduced deduction, with one of the premises missing. 
Such deduction is called an “enthymeme”. 
 6HH-RVH2UWHJD\*DVVHW´:KDWLV3KLORVRSK\µ&K,;
 &DUQDS57KH(OLPLQDWLRQRI0HWDSK\VLFV7KURXJK/RJLFDO$QDO\VLVRI/DQJXDJH
$QDO\WLFDO3KLORVRSK\%HFRPLQJDQG'HYHORSPHQW²0RVFRZ3URJUHVV7UDGLWLRQ3 
 6HH-+LQWLNND>@&RJLWRHUJRVXP,QIHUHQFHRUSHUIRUPDQFH"3KLORVRSKLFDO5HYLHZ72, p.3-
  -+LQWLNND>@7KH &DUWHVLDQ &RJLWR HSLVWHPLF /RJLF DQG 1HXURVFLHQFH VRPH VXUSULVLQJ
,QWHUUHODWLRQV7KH/RJLFRI(SLVWHPRORJ\DQG7KH(SLVWHPRORJ\RI/RJLF6HOHFWHG(VVD\V.OXZHU
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston-London, Volume 200, Managing Editor: Jaakko Hintikka, 
pp.113-136.
 'HVFDUWHV5:RUNVLQWZRYROXPHV0RVNYD0\VO9ROS
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So, Descartes’ statement Cogito ergo sum is an enthymeme.7  We know well from the 
history of European philosophy that its content has had great in!uence – (this cannot be 
doubted) – upon the entire European culture, which enables us to consider it the most 
famous Descartes’ enthymeme.  
Let us now produce a simple logical analysis of this enthymeme, as was possible within 
the frames of traditional logic, based upon the subject-predicate structure of propositions, 
not yet acquainted with quanti"er description. #en we shall demonstrate that this 
Descartes’ statement may be quite adequately described by the quantor of “existence” as 
well, without any change of meaning.   
To begin with, we shall fashion it into a logic form. For this we shall have to single out 
the conclusion. #is is the assertion after the term ergo (“therefore”): “I am”.  #ere are the 
subject (S) and the predicate (P) implied: “I(S) am(P)”.  Now we can fashion it into the 
shape of formal deduction:   
------------------------------(therefore)
I(S) - am(P)
As is known, the subject of a conclusion is always the minor term of a deduction, and 
the predicate – its major term. Basing on this, we can establish that the subject of the 
conclusion, that is “I(S)”, must be the subject(S) of the minor premise, and the predicate 
of the conclusion, that is “to be (P)”, must be the predicate of the major premise (P). #us, 
we see the incomplete deduction, plainly said by Descartes:   
I(S)  think (ǡ)
---------------------------------
 I(S)  am (P)
We still have to discover the implicitly present major premise. For this we have the 
knowledge of the medium term (M). It is the expression “to be thinking”(M). Now, having 
discovered the meanings of the minor, the medium and the major terms, let us look at the 
full form of the reasoning:   
7RWKLQNɆ+ – means to be (P)<
I(S)+WKLQNɆ<
--------------------------------- (therefore)
 I(S)+  -   am(P)<
7 The fact that the Cartesian dictum is an enthymeme is pointed out by Hintikka in one of his very early 
works [Hintikka:1962, p.20]. 
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We have a deduction according to the !rst !gure.  A correct one. Neither general rules, 
nor the rules of the !rst !gure are transgressed. "us, from my point of view, Descartes 
makes a rather sensible conclusion – “I exist” (“I am”).8  
However, in spite of this nearly trivial clarity, there might arise a rather unexpected 
question: How should we understand the logical relationship between such terms of the 
deduction as “to think” and “to be” (“to exist”)?  Strange as it might seem, there are at least 
two di#erent answers possible here.  
1)   "e !rst answer says that Descartes views the major premise of the deduction as 
follows:   
To think (ǡ)+ – means to be (P)-
In this case, the subject of the major premise “to think(ǡ)+” is taken in its full volume, 
that is, distributed, and the predicate “to be(P)-” is taken not in its full volume and hence 
is not distributed. "at is why it will not be distributed in the conclusion: “I(S)+ am(P)-”, 
either.   
"us the volumes of the terms will relate as mutually including. Really, out of the 
whole set of those who exist we can single out the subset who “think (M)” and then all the 
elements of the set (M) are fully included into the set (P). In other words, the volume of 
the set (P) is greater than the volume of the set (M).   
In the same way, out of the whole set of all thinking creatures (M) we can single out 
the one who is, for example, Descartes’ “I”.   
It should be admitted that such understanding of the Descartes’ enthymeme is most 
commonly accepted9, and so, from our point of view, it can lead us astray from the true 
meaning imparted to it by its author.  In order not to be led astray, we shall need another 
answer for the said question.
8 Therefore I venture to disagree with Hintikka’s interpretation:  “…it cannot be  a logical inference in 
the ordinary sense of the word” [ Hintikka, 1962,p.15]. Hintikka considers it to be rather an instant 
of Descartes’ intuition. Further on, he becomes more exact saying that the relation between COGITO 
DQG680DUHQRWWKRVHRIDSUHPLVHDQGLWVFRQFOXVLRQEXWUDWKHUWKRVH©RIDprocess to its productª>
Hintikka, 1962,p.16]. Hintikka’s argumentation in general insists that the Cartesian statement is just 
an utterance, just an “act of speech”, rather than a logical inference. This is why no logical analysis 
seems relevant in its case, which simply implicitly removes all its accusations in the mood of Kant or 
Carnap. Hintikka comes to the conclusion: “ …it refers to the “performance”(to the act of thinking) 
through which the sentence “I exist” may be  said to verify itself”.[Hintikka, 1962,p.17]. Indeed, from 
the point of view of mathematical logic, Descartes’ conclusion is absolutely unfounded, but don’t we 
have the right to analyze him by the very means available to him at his time (the traditional logic)?  
9 In particular, this interpretation of the major premise is shared by Hintikka:  “Descartes denied that 
his argument is an  enthymeme whose suppressed major premise is “Everybody  who thinks, exists”. 
[Hintikka:1962, p.20].  
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!e second answer.  
Let us once more turn to Descartes himself: 
«In the next place, I attentively examined what I was and as I observed  that I could 
suppose that I had no body, and that there was  no world nor any place  in which  i might 
be, but that i could not therefore suppose that i  was not;  and that, on the contrary, 
from the very circumstance  that I thought to doubt of the truth of other things, it most 
clearly and certainly followed that I was….»10
In fact, Descartes says here: “I exist, I doubt (think) and still – I can have no body!”  
What conclusions can we retrieve from this phrase? !ey are as follows:   
A) !e “thinking human I” is not identical to anything in the physical-bodily world 
existing in space and time.  
B)   Descartes’ sentence: “from the very circumstance  that I thought to doubt of the truth 
of other things, it most clearly and certainly followed that I was ” can be expressed in 
a more laconic way: “I can think if and only if I am”11.  
But if this is the case, we have quite a di5erent picture with Descartes’ enthymeme, that 
turns into a proposition of identity (equivalency), where the meaning of “to be a thinking I” 
is identical to the meaning of “to be an existing I”, and the meaning of “to be an existing I” 
is identical to that of “to be a thinking I”. It is exactly such “thinking and existing I” that 
Descartes calls “substance”: “…I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole 
essence or nature consists only in thinking…” 12
But if we accept the outlook that renders “thinking” identical to “being”, then we shall 
face a whole number of non-trivial conclusions of philosophic kind, able to be derived 
by logical way only. Such a changeover, however, can meet with the quite understandable 
perplexity of a reader: what conclusions could be ever reasonably discussed when the 
Cartesian statement itself was analyzed by the means of mere traditional logic, whose 
limitedness and insu6ciency has long become notorious. One of the 7rst researchers to 
demonstrate this limitedness most graphically – and in respect of the famous Cogito ergo 
sum in particular – was Rudolf Carnap.  
10 'HVFDUWHV5:RUNVLQWZRYROXPHV0RVNYD0\VO9ROS
11 It should be noted that there is no such step in the analysis of the Cartesian statement in the 1962 
Hintikka’s work. 
12 'HVFDUWHV5:RUNVLQWZRYROXPHV0RVNYD
Mysl, 1989, Vol.1, p.269.
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R. Carnap’s  Argumentation
R. Carnap, partly following E. Kant, points out two types of erroneous usage by 
metaphysicians of pseudo-statements containing the word “to be”.  !e "rst fault has to do 
with the polysemantical base of the word “to be” that can be used both as a link-verb (“man 
is a social being”) and as a verb designating existence (“the man is”) 13. Metaphysicians 
are very likely to ignore this di#erence. As is evident from the below, Descartes sees the 
di#erence quite well, that is, he does not mix the link-verb “to be” with the same verb 
meaning “to exist”.  
In Carnap’s opinion, «!e  second  fault lies in the form  of the verb in its second 
meaning, the meaning of existence. !e verbal form feigns a predicate where there is no… 
But it was  not until the advent of modern logic that full consistency on this point  was 
reached: the syntactical form in which modern logic introduces  the sign for existence  is 
such that it cannot, like a  predicate, be applied to signs  for objects, but only to predicates… 
Most  metaphysicians  since antiquity  have allowed  themselves to be seduced into pseudo-
statements by the verbal, and  therewith the predicative form of the word “to be” , e.g. “I 
am”, “God is”. We meet an illustration of this error in Descartes’ “cogito, ergo sum.” 14
Carnap goes on to make his arguments against the Cartesian statement more speci"c, 
pointing out two essential errors. !e "rst is to be found in the concluding clause “I am” 
15. What’s wrong with it? !e thing is that the verb “to be” is used here in its meaning 
of “existence”. If it is so, such usage contradicts, in Carnap’s opinion, the rule of logic: 
existence can be stated only in respect of a predicate, but not in respect of a nominal (a 
subject, a proper name).   
According to this rule, a statement of existence should never have the form “a  exists”, 
as in the case with Anselm asserting that “God exists” or with Descartes asserting that “I 
exist”, but the form “there exists something of such and such a kind” 16. !e true meaning 
of this rule is: no premises allow to assert the existence of the subject of the original statement. 
!us, it does not follow from the statement “I am a European” that “I exist”, but it only 
follows from it that “there exists a European” 17.   
Saying this, Carnap means that there is, in the formalized language, a certain “quantor 
of existence” corresponding to the verb “to exist” and designated by the symbol (). When 
Carnap says “there exists something” he means the syntactical expression ȩ.
13 Carnap R.,p.73. 
14 Carnap, p.73-74. 
15 Ibidem, p.74.
16 Ibidem, p.74
17 Hintikka [Hintikka, 1962,p.8] pays attention to the fact that a logic can well be constructed with no 
H[LVWHQWLDO SUHPLVHV QRWLQJ KRZHYHU WKDW'HVFDUWHVZDVÀUP LQ DGKHULQJ WR H[LVWHQWLDO SUHPLVHV
[Hintikka, 1962,p.8]. 
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Of course, it is necessary in the formal logic that quantors should relate to a nonempty 
set of individuals (a universum of reasoning), that is a universum containing at least one set 
member. In fact, Carnap wants to say: “there exists x such that x thinks (T)” – ȩ T(ȩ). To 
establish the “nonemptiness” of the entire universum of statements we need to introduce 
a criterion of nonemptiness. !e requirement of “consistency” can serve for descriptive 
statements such an “ontological” criterion: everything that can be described consistently 
– exists.   
Now, after the Cartesian statement has gone through Carnap’s criticism, let us 
reconstruct all those Descartes’ statements – both explicit and implicit – that we found 
analyzing the Cartesian enthymeme by means of traditional logic, this time viewing it in 
the perspective of our modern logic.  
Descartes’ Enthymeme expressed in the modern logic
Descartes’ statement “I think, therefore, I am” can be expressed in the generalized 
form:
T (I am)  ȩ (ȩ= I am) 18
Such formulation meets Carnap’s requirements: !at it is inadmissible to simulate existence 
where there is no. We introduce the variable x that runs along the universum of “those 
thinking”, designated by the predicate T.  !erefore the expression ȩZȩ	  is read as 
follows: “there is such an x that x thinks”. !en a conclusion is drawn from here: “if there 
is such an x that x thinks, then there is such an x that x is I ( x = I )”.  
!at it is inadmissible to infer the statement “I am” from the statement “I think”. As 
we remember, according to Carnap, what follows from the statement “I think” is only that 
“there exists something that thinks”. !e second part of the expression has, after the sign 
of implication “”, the quantor of existence, pointing not at the quality of “existence” but 
just at the fact that the universum along which the variable x is running – is nonempty. So, 
this requirement is also met. 
However, an analysis of the Cartesian proposition made in the language of traditional 
logic has shown that this proposition is an enthymeme, that is, it contains an implicit 
premise related to the minor particular premise and the particular  inference as a general 
statement: “To think means to be”. Neither Carnap, nor Hintikka make this step analyzing 
the Cartesian proposition.  
18 A similar analysis of the Cartesian statement was presented by J.Hintikka: 1962, Cogito,ergo,sum: 
,QIHUHQFHRUSHUIRUPDQFH"3KLORVRSKLFDO5HYLHZ72, p.6. Hintikka puts it like this: B (a)  ((x) (x 
= a). [Hintikka, p.6]
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Let us put it down in the symbolic language of the !rst-order logic of predicates. As 
its !rst part embraces the whole range of those thinking, let us introduce the quantor “any” 
(“) for the variable x and the predicate “"inking” (T). "us the following expression arises: 
“ȩ T (ȩ)
"e second part of the proposition, after the word “therefore” can be represented as 
follows. "e quantor “any” will be introduced once more, for the variable x running along 
the universum “real” (R).  As a result, uniting the left and the right parts of the proposition, 
we shall get the new expression:   
   “ȩ (T (ȩ)   R (ȩ))    
As we have ascertained that Descartes saw this proposition as an equivalence of the left 
and the right parts of the expression, let us insert the sign of equivalence ««». "e result 
will be:  
(I)   «ȩ (T (ȩ) « R (ȩ))
that can be read like this: “Any x thinks, if and only if, this x is real”. In accordance 
with the rule of reduction – “from the general statement containing the quantor (“) there 
follows a particular statement containing the quantor of existence ()” – we make a 
conclusion and get the very proposition by Descartes that has originally been the subject 
of our discussion: “I think, therefore, I am”:  
 (II) T (I am) «  ȩ  (R (ȩ) & (ȩ = I am))   
Now we can write the Cartesian proposition down in the generalized form, as it is 
implied in his entire reasoning:  
(III)   «ȩ (T (ȩ) « R (ȩ))  ÷¾   T (ȩ) «  ȩ ( R(ȩ) & (ȩ = I am)) 
Where sign «÷¾ » means  «follow»,  predicate T means «to be Thinking» and predicate 
R means  «to be Real». It should be mentioned that the expression (I) plays the role of a 
general law for the expression (II).   
Special attention, of course, should be paid to our understanding of “existence” as 
such. Leaving aside the question of this predicate appropriateness, let us try to understand 
what Descartes himself meant by it. Did he mean merely “existence in the spatial-temporal 
corporeal world”? As is known, Descartes was a dualist, and so the set of elements res 
cogitans  should not intersect for him with the set of elements res extensa. "erefore, 
speaking of “existence” Descartes could not have meant the existence of a spatial body.    
We see it is not at all so simple a question. To approximate as we can, not even to its 
salvation  but just to the comprehension of its utter complexity, let us use the approach 
suggested by A.M. Anisov19 who followed Descartes in this matter. Anisov suggests that 
we should assume the existence of things of two di#erent kinds. "e !rst group of things 
are mental objects, run along by individual variables x; y;z;x1....  "e second group of 
19 $QLVRY$07KH1RWLRQ RI5HDOLW\ DQG/RJLF  ,QYHVWLJDWLRQV LQ/RJLF ²0RVFRZ ,QVWLWXWH RI
Philosophy of Russian Academy of Science, 2005. P. 24-25. In Russian. 
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things are real objects, run along by individual variables X;Y,Z, X1..... According to this 
assumption, we can write the Cartesian proposition down in the form of: 
I think (I) ®  ȩ (ȩ = I)
But as the variable is taken according to mental objects (x), the existence of the object 
(the second part  ȩ (ȩ = I)) is also mental. In the meanwhile, it is clear that when Descares 
said “I am” he meant “real” existence (though in a form known to him alone) that may be 
written down in the form: I think (I) ®  ȩ (ȩ = I). 
As we have already mentioned, Descartes disapproved of identi!cation of mental ego 
with spatial bodies. "en, what kind of existence did he mean, if mixing (uniting) the two 
kind of realities together was inadmissible for him?  
To clarify this question, we should also assume that Descartes did not identify subjective 
mentality with objective mentality. "at is, what for Kant and Carnap was an obvious fact – 
mental reality being placed entirely within the human mental experience – was absolutely 
di#erent for Descartes: mental reality was for him something common for man and God. 
Was God not putting ideas into human mind? He was, for Descartes. Naturally, logical 
positivism forbids such “objective mentality” as a sad vestige of metaphysics. But the fact 
is that Descartes, deprived of this reality, seems to mix up, “in the hands” of his logical 
interpreters, analytical and actual existence.  
So, what’s the result? We have to admit there were four realities for Descartes: two 
mental ones and two actual ones. Mental reality: Ǖ1 – inside the I (the thinking I); Ǖ2 
– outside the I (the thinking God). Actual reality: Ǘ1 – inside the I (the spatial body “in 
parallel to which” the I is thinking); Ǘ2 – outside the I (other bodies in the space around 
the body “in parallel to which” the I is thinking)20. 
What do sceptics do? "ey eliminate the reality Ǖ2 , uniting the realities Ǘ1 and Ǘ2 into 
one, let it be designated as Ǘ1  Ǘ2  (though Kant, on the contrary,  reduces Ǘ2  to Ǘ1). "e 
symbol «» is used here for “uniting”.  Having accomplished such elimination, they !nd 
themselves facing the necessity to “jump out” of the reality Ǖ1 into the reality Ǘ1 Ǘ2.  
 "ere was no di$culty here for Descartes, for “the I” for him was a substance whose 
entire essence consisted in thinking. Neither God had any limitations for being connected 
with the inner mental reality of man – A1 .   
Of course, Descartes could have meant that his “thinking” and his “existence” were 
equivalent and identical in the reality of Ǖ1 and Ǖ2 .21  
So, let us remember once more the prohibition proclaimed by Descartes: one mustn’t 
identify the spatial body with the thinking substance! "e substance can think without 
20 It seems just to note that such approach is not perfectly novel in the Cartesian COGITO analysis. The 
IXQGDPHQWDOVLJQLÀFDQFHRIVXFKGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQZDVVWUHVVHGHJE\+LQWLNND>+LQWLNNDS@
making clear distinctions between the “perceptual space” and the “physical space”. 
21 In a sense, the same is pointed out by Hintikka [Hintikka, 1962,p.10], when he says that “…his result 
may be expressed by saying that it was impossible for him to deny his existence”.
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the body, and the body can be left without the thinking substance. What shall we need it 
for? Exactly for clearing up the non-trivial conclusions that may be drawn from the famous 
Cartesian enthymeme.   
Connections with bioethics.
Here we shall talk of the two new !elds of ethics, originating from the twentieth 
century, – the environmental and the biomedicine ethics.    
When discussing questions belonging to the !rst ethic !eld, we can very often hear 
that no moral (ethic) relationships are possible between man (I) and his environment (the 
physical nature), because this latter is not a thinking (and wider – “animate”) substance, 
hence, nature cannot be the subject of any moral (ethic) relationships or estimations.    
In the same way, in the second !eld, it is very often proclaimed that no moral (ethic) 
relationships between human beings (the mother) and a foetus can take place, for a foetus 
is not a thinking substance, and so cannot be a subject of moral (ethic) relationships, not 
yet existing as a human being.   
In this connection Fred Frohock’s work22  seems of interest, containing a chapter 
“Human Identity”, specially devoted to the question: Who exactly can be called a human 
being, a who – cannot! "e answer requires a valid de!nition. Making his position clear, 
Frohock refers to an article by Joseph Fletcher23, who gives several positive “indicators of 
humanhood” and several negative. "e positive ones include: certain minimum intellect, 
self-consciousness, self-control, the sense of time, the sense of the future, the sense of the 
past, the ability to communicate and some other. "e negative are – the absence of parental 
or sexual feelings, non-observance of human rights, etc.  
But Fletcher’s main idea, in Frohock’s opinion, is that «…to be human is to be thinking, 
re#ective creature»24.  And Frohock cites something of really exceptional signi!cance for 
our work: 
«"e life of the mind has been central to western understanding of humanness in 
centuries of law and morality…A man who loses his arms, his legs, any part of his body, is 
not in law considered less of a person as a consequence of the loss. But neurological de!cits 
may render him legally impaired, his judgments transferable to a guardian who decide for 
him» 
"en Frohock asks: Can using rational thinking be considered an indicator of 
“humanness”? Really:   
«We can be more or less thoughtful. Are we  more or less human as a result?»25
22 Frohock Fred M., Special Care Medical Decisions at the Deginning of Life.- The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, London, - 1986.
23 )OHWFKHU-RVHSK,QGLFDWRUVRI+XPDQKRRG+DVWLQJV&HQWHUUHSRUW1RYHPEHU
24 )URKRFN)UHG0ǥ
25 )URKRFN)UHG0ǥ
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Assuming that we raise the index of “humanness” to the mentioned Descartes’ 
enthymeme, we leave those who do not pass the neurologic threshold outside the 
community of “humans”, but among such “nonentities” there would be quite a number 
of sick people.   
If, on the contrary, we let the threshold of “humanness” slip down, then both the 
foetus in a mother’s womb and some animals (like anthropoid apes, dogs etc) are found 
in the set of humans. Finally, Frohock comes to the conclusion: «Perhaps the method of 
de!ning is wrong. "ere may be no unique test of humanness»26.    
Of course, Frohock does not analyse the Descartes postulate, but he de!nitely feels 
and rationally demonstrates the limitedness of the approach that we have agreed to call 
ratiofundamentalism. What is the reason for its clearly felt limitedness?  
As we see it, Descartes’ philosophic doctrine has proved a good theoretic foundation 
for some absolutely unexpected conclusions about the ontological “status” of man27. 
Really, what does Descartes states? “if I think, I am”. Assuming that we say categorically: “I 
think” – logical necessity leads us, according to the rules of positive conditional-categorical 
deduction Modus Ponens, to the conclusion – “I am”: P ® Q, P/Q.  
Now, if a foetus (the environment, a person in the state of coma) shows no explicit 
signs of a thinking substance, what’s then?   
Not without reason we can presume that Descartes allowed that:    P ® Q, ù P/ù Q
"is can easily meet with objection: this is an incorrect form of negative conditional-
categorical syllogism. "at is, the conclusion from it is incorrect! "is cannot be argued. 
Descartes’ reputation seems to be saved? Well, let’s take our time.  
Unexpected logical  conclusions from Descartes’ enthymeme  
Indeed, we remember that
p q p º q
t t t t t
t f t f f
f t f t t
f f f t f
(Table 1)
According to the tabular method of stating the truth of a conditional conclusion, it is 
true in all cases except when the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. "is means 
that the case when P ® Q, P / ù Q  is not possible!  
Modus Ponens is, of course, based upon the !rst line, when both the antecedent and 
the consequent are true. "at is why we cannot say that ù P in the case  P ® Q, ù P / ? .   
26 Frohock Fred M.,P.113.
27 6HH 3DYOHQNR$QGUH\8QLYHUVDOLVP DQG FRVPLF KDUPRQ\ 3ULQFLSOH RI JHQHWLF VLPLODULW\ 3*6
6NHSVLV;9,3
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But, when discussing the “answer two” version, we agreed to think that Descartes gives 
us a proposition of identity (equivalence). !en, if we analyse this case in the light of what 
have just been said, the situation will be radically di"erent:  
    
p q p © q
t t t t t
t f t f f
f t f f t
f f f t f
(Table 2)
We see that, in the case of equivalence, the conditional conclusion is false in all cases 
when the antecedent and the consequent have di"erent meanings.  
And here starts the most fascinating thing: 
Step 1.  Descartes admits the identity of thinking and being.
Step 2.  !is identity can be strictly logically formulated: ”I think, if and only if, I am”. 
Step 3. As P is equivalent to Q, we can assert: “I do not think, if and only if, I am not; 
I do not think, therefore, I am not”   
ù P  « ù Q, ù P/ ù Q
And indeed, if in the case of simple implication we say that “if it rains, the roofs are 
wet; it is raining – the roofs are wet”. But, assuming the statement “it is not raining”, are 
we able to make a legitimate conclusion about the roofs?  No, we are not, for in this case 
the fact of their dampness (dryness) will depend merely on the actual state of raining and 
nothing else. Is there any logical necessity to make the conclusion that “the roofs are not 
wet” from the statement that “it is not raining”? No, there isn’t.    
However, if we take an example with a “square”, the picture will be di"erent: “if a given 
#gure is a square, it is an equilateral quadrangle. !e given #gure is a square, therefore, it is 
an equilateral quadrangle”.  Let us try changing the quality of the conditional proposition 
“if a given #gure is not a square, it is not an equilateral quadrangle”!   
So, it happens that the incorrect Modus P ® Q, ù P/ ?   is really incorrect only for 
simple conditional propositions, whereas for the equivalent propositions it happens to be 
correct P  « Q, ù P/ù Q ! 
How does this logic conclusion help us to grasp the implicit meaning hidden in the 
most famous Descartes’ enthymeme?   
Unexpected anthropological conclusions from Descartes’ enthymeme  
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First of all, this logic conclusion helps us to understand the fact that, reducing the entire 
wealth of the human inner life to a thinking substance, Descartes, whether he wished so or 
not, triggered the mechanism of dehumanization of man, having deprived the plenitude of 
human existence of its very signi!cant part (as the human existence exactly): in the prenatal 
period, in the unconscious states of sleep or coma, etc!
Descartes’ actual enthymeme claims:   
“I think if and only if I am”.
"e conclusion, made by some most ardent Descartes’ followers, simply suggested 
itself:    
“I do not think if and only if I am not”.   
"e meaning of the last statement is this: existence without thinking is, for a thinking 
substance, not existence at all! A human foetus in prenatal period does not think, therefore 
it does not exist, as a thinking substance. A man in old age, in an unconscious state or 
in coma – does not think, therefore, he does not exist at all, and so a fatal dose of drug 
“putting him away” – is not in the least a tool of murder that can (or should) be judged 
from the moral point of view. Euthanasia ceases to be a moral problem: for how can you 
deprive of being what does not exist at all!   
From my point of view, this is an absolutely inhuman conclusion, wherefore, however 
inconceivable that may sound, I feel obliged to acknowledge the irrefutable philosophic 
fact: though Descartes himself – (we must admit it for the sake of scienti!c rigour) – never 
came out in vindication of euthanasia or arti!cial abortion, he is sure to have opened wide 
the logical passage to the sphere of such vindication, admitting equivalence between “thinking” 
and “existing” substances.    
And this theoretical démarche of his was the very thing that laid the foundation of the 
New-European ratiofundamentalist tradition.
Reaction to ratiofundamentalism
"ree general trends are possible, as we see it, in stepping away from the “pure” 
ratiofundamentalism.   
"e !rst trend is represented in philosophy by nihilism, postmodernism and the like. 
In most cases their demands can be generally expressed like this: “"e supremacy of reason 
has come to an end!”, the “principles” of reason should be cast away as a variety of human 
mythological patterns, narrations etc. Logically, this tendency should result in nothing but: 
intellectual and anthropological involution28.  Under the exterior of denying all universal 
“foundations” and “principles”, adherents of this philosophic trend are !rmly convinced that 
human reason (as all reasonable things in general) is subordinate to a certain inexpressible 
28 Just compare: adherents of biological evolution believe man to have come from subhuman primates 
(“apes”), whereas adherents of biological involution, vice versa,  believe nonhuman primates (“apes”) 
to be degenerated humans. 
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“Nothing”, called by some of them “the chaos”, by others “the energy without any essence” 
etc.  
!e second trend is a “Renewed rationalism”. Its adherent’s main credo may be described 
as: “Of course, the human reason might be restricted in some respect, but its supremacy 
cannot be doubted”. !ey view the principles of reason as kind of “fundamental scale” to 
measure all human, natural and technical worlds of the past, the present and the future. 
In our opinion, such domination of reason must logically lead to a quite predictable end: 
the intellectual and anthropological "nalism29.  For those who adhere to this trend, the 
“equivalence between thinking and being” is a doubtless fact.  
!e third trend is really an “Overcoming of ratiofundamentalism”. Its representatives 
are the most scanty group in the modern philosophy. !ey set for themselves the task of 
liberation the reason from the duties and functions alien to it, as, for example, to be “the 
foundation of the world” or “the fundamental scale” etc.  According to their views, the 
principles of reason, though very important for explaining the world, are not su#cient 
to be the universal “scale” to measure its wholeness. On the other hand, they consider it 
inadmissible to place the human reason below some inexpressible “nothing”. A coherent 
result of this trend’s development must be the literal reanimation of harmony between the 
reason and the world, where the content of being is immeasurably richer than the content 
of thinking. 
!ere is a point in assuming that the adherents of the “renewed rationalism” can quite 
rightfully put forward an argument for Descartes’ justi"cation: “Yes, it is so and we really 
come to rather unexpected conclusions if we agree to understand Descartes’ enthymeme 
as containing a proposition of equivalence as the major premise. But is really Descartes 
alone to blame? Does not his major premise say: ‘To be thinking means to be existing’ and 
vice versa, that is, proclaims identity between thinking and being? - but this is not at all a 
new idea! It was not he who discovered it "rst, neither was he the "rst to found a school of 
thought upon it. Does not Parmenides state the same in his poem On Nature?”  
Right, in the fragments of the mentioned Parmenides’ poem we "nd the following 
words: 
V.1. !ought and being are one and the same thing. 
It would be fair to admit that this short phrase had once laid the foundation of the 
entire European civilization that was still to come.
An alternative to ratiofundamentalism 
However, we should make it clear at once, that ancient thinkers, as contrasted to 
Descartes, never reduced the multifarious wealth of human psychic life to mere thinking. 
Psychic life is on the whole much broader than thinking. On the other hand, the entire 
29 $SRVVLEOHVFHQDULRKHUHLQHYLWDEO\OHDGVWRWKHDSSHDUDQFHRIWKH´DQDQWKURSRVµ:HGZHOORQVXFK
DVFHQDULR LQPRUHGHWDLO LQDQRWKHUZRUN3DYOHQNR$1(FRORJLFDO&ULVLVDVD3VHXGRSUREOHP
4XHVWLRQVRI3KLORVRSK\0RVFRZǔ,Q5XVVLDQ
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cosmos, being for them animated, participated, to some extent, in thinking – which Plato 
states in “Timaeus” quite unambiguously. !e Demiurge, as follows from Plato (Tim.30b), 
adheres to the following considerations when creating the Cosmos:  
«Now the deeds of the best could never be or have been other than the fairest; and the 
creator, re"ecting on the things which are by nature visible, found that no unintelligent 
creature taken as a whole was fairer than the intelligent taken as a whole; and that 
intelligence could not be present in anything which was devoid of soul. For which 
reason, when he was framing the universe, he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, 
that he might be the creator of a work which was by nature fairest and best». «Timaeus» 
(Tim.30 b):
Let us repeat once more Plato’s assertion bearing a direct relation to the discussed 
Descartes’ enthymeme:   
«that intelligence could not be present in anything which was devoid of soul»
What conclusions can we draw from this? Simply these:
Reason does not exist apart from the soul.  
2) It follows from point 1 that any reduction of the entire psychic life of man to his 
thinking substance (reason) if unlawful.  
3) !e statement “to think means to exist” if not factually true, for it follows from 
point 2 that quite another statement is true: “to think with one’s soul involved means to 
exist”.    
If we agree with these conclusions, then we have to admit that Descartes’ syllogism 
accepts a di#erent form:    
To think-with-one’s-soul-involved means to be 
I   think-with-my-soul-involved   
---------------------------------------
I am    
Or in the form of an enthymeme:  “I think-with-my-soul-involved, therefore, I am” 
Here we also have an equivalence of the two notions “to think-with-one’s-soul-involved” 
and “to be existing”. But in this case there cannot be even imagined a possibility to deny 
the human status of a “foetus”, for P  « Q, ù P/   ù Q.  
What is inanimate-and-thinking has no being. !is is true. Really, any form of non-
being – the “centaurs”, the “ghosts” – are such inanimate-thinking things. But everything 
that has a soul, all animate things – by no means can belong to the realm of “the non-
existing” (non-being). And here we see a true alternative to ratiofundamentalism of all 
kinds.  
Conclusion  
So, what results have we got from this analysis?  
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1. !e speci"c interpretation Descartes gave to the well-known postulate of “the 
identity of thinking and being” turned out to have provided theoretical foundation, that 
is, the prerequisite creating the very possibility of the “ratiofundamentalist” phenomenon.
2. !is work demonstrates that Descartes’ statement ”cogito, ergo sum” is an 
enthymeme, where the “omitted premise” is his admission of the “identity of thinking 
and being” that can be represented in the form of equivalence: “to think « to be (to exist)”. 
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